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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether companies that contracted loans from the
Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) between 2002 and 2014 were
able to invest more than companies that did not. The literature on financial constraints, particularly
that based on the investment-cash flow sensitivity model, is among the most studied and
controversial in the area of finance, and the discussion on the role of development banks is equally
controversial.
Design/methodology/approach – The main econometric model of this study was based on the
investment-cash flow sensitivity model, with the incorporation of a binary variable that captures
the role of the BNDES. This model is applied to a sample of companies listed on the B3 from 2002 to
2014.
Findings – This study shows that loans from the BNDES amplify the effects of cash flow on investments,
generating a kind of credit multiplier. An important role of development banks is to reduce the financial
constraints typical of developing countries.
Research limitations/implications – The use of the cash flow sensitivity model in companies that
contracted loans from the BNDES is a relevant instrument to test the effect of the BNDES on companies with
financial constraints.
Practical implications – The contracting of BNDES loans by companies can affect both capital structure
and cash generation, particularly in companies or years in which there was financial constraint.
Social implications – Due to the nature of the BNDES as a development bank, there are ramifications in
terms of the generation of employment and income inherent to the mission of this type of institution. Knowing
the multiplier effect on the cash flow potential of companies has a direct impact on their preservation,
enabling them to maintain and expand the supply of jobs.
Originality/value – This study is the first to integrate two important areas of study. From the theoretical
perspective, this study provides evidence on the relationship between the BNDES and company financial
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constraints that open new avenues of research. From the managerial point of view, the evidence of the
multiplier effect is highly important for themanagement of the capital structure and cash flow of companies.
Keywords Development banks, Cash flow, Bank loans, Financial constraint
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
After the Second World War, many countries experienced economic and social devastation.
The economies devastated by these conflicts needed reconstruction. The world powers that
polarized the political-economic influences of the time – such as the USA and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – also collaborated to finance the restoration of many
countries. Such restoration occurred largely through public banks.
In a planned economy, in which the state was the center of the production and organization of
the country’s wealth – as in the USSR – the state bank was part of the system. However, in
capitalist economies, the creation of public banks was not the rule. Even so, many public banks
were founded as development banks and helped in the organization of government strategies. In
this context, a long-term capital flow for restoring economic growth and development was
provided by public banks (Svejnar, 2002). In the context of economic recovery, development
banks were to fulfill their role and then become extinct because their low interest rates should not
compete with private banks. However, many public banks continued to operate in countries such
asGermany, Japan, Canada, Brazil and China (Ferraz, Além,&Madeira, 2013; Hermann, 2011).
The importance and effectiveness of public development banks have not attained
consensus among scholars. In poor countries, with low per capita income, the preservation of
development banks is important for long-term sources of funds. Industries related to the
implementation of basic sanitation infrastructure, energy matrices and logistical structures
for the flow of wealth can be financed by development banks (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999;
Hermann, 2011; Torres & Zeidan, 2016). However, countries with interventionist
governments and with low guarantees of property rights have shown slow economic
development despite the presence of development banks. This contrast can be observed in
countries without a large state presence in banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer,
2002; Megginson, 2005) and raises an important question about the role of development
banks in reducing the financial constraints faced by companies.
In this context, the objective of this study is to analyze whether companies that
contracted loans from the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development
(BNDES) between 2002 and 2014 were able to invest more than companies that did not. The
results of analyzing the companies listed on the B3 (the Brazilian stock exchange) show that
companies that borrowed from the BNDES were able to make greater investments. In
addition, and more importantly, BNDES loans amplify the effects of cash flow on
investments, generating a kind of credit multiplier. In other words, the BNDES multiplies
the investment capacity of each monetary unit of cash flow generated by the company. This
last result is the main contribution of this article.
The article consists of five parts, including the Introduction in Section 1, Theoretical
Framework in Section 2, Methodological Procedures in Section 3, Results and Final
Considerations in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 The role of development banks in national economies
Development banks are financial institutions that are generally sponsored by national or




banks are related to the provision of long-term capital for a country’s industries and the
implementation or expansion of the national infrastructure. Thus, development banks offer
loans in the market or participate in the capital of private companies (Torres & Zeidan,
2016).
The emergence of development banks is often linked to the reconstruction of a country
after a crisis or war. Luna-Martínez and Vicente (2012) conducted a global survey on
national development banks and their characteristics, noting that more than 88% were
formed after the SecondWorldWar.
In addition to the national development banks, there are large development banks for
continental geographic areas. For example, the World Bank, together with other
transnational development banks, is member of the group of multilateral development
banks. In this context, five institutions help promote the world economy: the World Bank,
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank (Nelson, 2015).
The life cycle of development banks is linked to the development of a country, enabling
them to monitor and promote the growth and development of industry and infrastructure.
Once they have fulfilled their role, they then transition to indirect operations and move
toward their natural extinction (Hermann, 2011; Torres & Zeidan, 2016).
Development banks arise to meet the needs of developing countries due to the scarcity of
long-term capital in the promotion of industrialization and to promote the consequent
development of the country. Moreover, they play a particularly positive role in poor
countries by providing long-term credit for the development of industry and infrastructure
(Hermann, 2011; Torres & Zeidan, 2016). Because they supply long-term resources,
development banks are seen as promoters of national wealth and knowledge acquisition in
long-term financial management (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999).
The presence of development banks in poor countries can be beneficial, as long as they
operate without exercising leadership in the financial market. These public banks can
complement the performance of private banks. In addition, they absorb some of the risks of
infrastructure projects, enabling the development of countries in which there are
institutional and financial market gaps (Torres & Zeidan, 2016).
In developed countries, development banks follow the growth and development of the
economy. In this case, there is an increase in per capita income, greater domestic savings,
lower risk aversion and capital allocation to medium- and long-term assets. These benefits
help alter the degree of market incompleteness, allowing it to reach different sectors than
under poor economic development conditions. To meet a new market configuration,
development banks must readjust to the new needs of the country. Thus, even economic and
financial development requires new operating strategies for these banks. In Europe and
Japan, for example, these institutions took on new functions in addition to the needs of the
financial market (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999; Hermann, 2011).
Although the performance of development banks has a positive side, they can
nonetheless bring adverse effects to the country when there is majority state ownership in
financial institutions that promote the economy (Luna-Martínez & Vicente, 2012). In their
study, the authors provide a profile of the participation of state capital in development
banks. In 74% of 90 banks surveyed in 2009, the capital was 100% state-owned; in 21%, the
state held between 50 and 99% of the capital; and in 5%, the government owned less than
50% of the capital.
The marked presence of the state is more frequent in the development banks of poor or
developing countries that experience low per capita income, the presence of interventionist





countries with this profile, even if they had development banks, showed slower economic
development than countries with little government intervention in banks. This difference
may have been caused by the predominance of political decisions in lending at the expense
of technical decisions. Development banks began to grant credit based on political
influences, which may have resulted in low efficiency and, consequently, slow and lower
economic development (La Porta et al., 2002).
Although state ownership may be important in a country’s developmental period, over
time, the strong presence of governments in development banks can lead to corruption. A
possible indicator of corruption is the selection of projects with negative net present value
(NPV) to receive funds from public banks (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999).
2.2 The Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development
The founding of the BNDES in 1952 is in line with the theories of origin of development
banks, such as the offer of support to the development of countries that do not have
sufficient sources of long-term financing (Paiva, 2012). The BNDES is among the
development banks with the highest asset value (Ferraz et al., 2013; Luna-Martínez &
Vicente, 2012).
In keeping with the theory of development banks, the BNDES has provided the Brazilian
market with increasing financial disbursements since its foundation. The period from 2004
to 2010 marked an acceleration of BNDES loan disbursements in the credit market
(Figure 1).
Companies with long-term capital needs sought BNDES loans in this period. According
to Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello, and Marcon (2015), the BNDES was not sought
only by companies with poor financial performance. Many companies that contracted loans
had characteristics that enabled them to seek resources in the private market. Bonomo,




















































































were larger and older and had lower risk. Therefore, they could also have been served by the
private banking market.
It is important to note that side effects may occur in BNDES loaning to companies in
which there is public capital, known as “crony capitalism” (Torres & Zeidan, 2016). One
aspect of this distortion is the finding that some companies that contracted BNDES loans
directed the resources to investments that created jobs in regions of electoral interest to
political candidates allied with the federal government in election years. In other words,
political decisions can influence loans from state banks that, in turn, lend resources to
companies located in regions of electoral interest (Carvalho, 2014). Thus, the creation of jobs
leads the electorate to see the public administration as effective, which may increase their
chances of reelection.
Regardless of the characteristics of the companies and the political motivations that
involve BNDES operations, the use of BNDES loans would enhance the investment capacity
of companies, which leads to our first hypothesis:
H1. Companies that borrowed from the BNDES invested more due to greater access to
an external resource.
2.3 Financial constraints and the credit multiplier
To check only whether companies that borrowed from the BNDES invested more – the focus
of H1 – may be insufficient. After all, there is arguably a positive mechanical relationship
between borrowing and investing. Therefore, our study proposes that investments are
higher in companies that have borrowed from the BNDES because they amplify the effects
of each monetary unit of cash flow, creating a kind of credit multiplier. This effect has
already been observed in, for example, tangibility (Almeida & Campello, 2007). However, no
study was found that analyzed the multiplier effect of BNDES on investments. This
analysis, therefore, constitutes themain contribution of this article.
Financial constraints are identified when a company does not have many options to seek
external resources to finance its investments in production structure, such as machinery,
real estate and other tangible assets, and depends more on its cash flow generated in the
business. In the absence of financial constraints, even if the company has an available and
sufficient cash flow generated by the business itself, it can choose whether to use this
internal resource or seek external sources of financing, such as loans or capital, through the
issuance of shares. In other words, in the presence of financial constraints, company
investments depend much more on internal sources of funds. In the absence of restrictions,
investments have multiple sources, and the company can choose where it will obtain its
financial resources from (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988; Kaplan & Zingales, 1995).
The presence of financial constraints is related to information asymmetry because
creditors can decrease their credit supply or protect themselves by raising interest rates and
requiring more real guarantees based on the extent to which information is unknown or
distorted. The same occurs between business owners (investors) and executives; if the
information is unclear, there may be difficulties in obtaining external financial resources.
From this perspective, lenders and investors charge more when there is no abundant or clear
information about companies and their management (Almeida & Campello, 2010; Fazzari
et al., 1988).
Fazzari et al. (1988) propose a methodology to measure a company’s financial constraints
based on the investment-cash flow sensitivity model. The authors state that a company’s
investments are influenced by its cash flow and by its investment opportunities (e.g. Tobin’s





opportunities regardless of internal cash flow generation, since this company would have
the ability to seek external resources, either through loans or by issuing new shares.
However, a company with more restricted access to the foreign market would depend more
on its internal cash generation. As a result, the sensitivity of the investment to cash flow
would be greater in financially constrained companies.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) disagree with Fazzari et al. (1988) when arguing that cash
flow is not an adequate measure of financial constraint. They used the same sample as
Fazzari et al. (1988) and reclassified the companies by types of financial constraint,
according to the analysis of accounting reports, through considering the debt-to-capital
ratio, interest payment, dividend distribution and excess cash. These authors concluded that
companies without financial constraints showed greater sensitivity of investment to cash
flow.
Another approach that furthered the discussions was that of Cleary, Povel, and
Raith, (2007) and Guariglia (2008). Their studies found that the relationship between
investments and cash flow followed a “U” curve, which reconciled the conclusions of
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The model assumes that
companies can be classified based on indicators of internal resources or external
resources. In young and small companies, there is a tendency for the relationship
between cash flow and investments to be negative; the opposite trend occurs in larger
and mature companies. Thus, in a sample, different relationships between the
sensitivity of investments and cash flow could be found.
In terms of the Brazilian market, four studies are relevant to the investigation of the
financial constraints of Brazilian companies. Terra (2003) found that all companies in the
sample had financial constraints, with lower intensity for large and multinational
corporations. Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010) expected that smaller companies would
experience greater financial constraint, but that was not confirmed. As the size of companies
increased, there was a greater sensitivity of investments to cash flow availability.
Crisostomo, Iturriaga, and Gonzalez (2014) found that the presence of nonfinancial
companies in the ownership structure of other companies contributed to the reduction of
financial constraint. Ghani, Martelanc, and Kayo (2015) did not find differences in
information asymmetry between public and private companies. A possible interpretation of
the result would be the intense interference of credit with an increase in the supply of loans
by mixed-capital and state-owned banks, which would interfere in the cash flow relationship
of companies and their investments. This statement leads to the issue of financial constraint
and government interference via state financial institutions, such as the BNDES.
In line with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Almeida and Campello (2007) argue that a
company’s degree of tangibility can ease its financial constraints. Companies with a higher
value of tangible assets can offer greater guarantees to creditors and, therefore, would have
a greater supply of potential credit. Investors, in general, would operate under that same
principle, seeking investments with real and tangible guarantees. In this context, Almeida
and Campello (2007) found evidence that tangibility increases the ability of cash flow to
generate new investments, which the authors call a credit multiplier, but only in financially
constrained companies. Starting from the premise that the BNDES mitigates financial
constraint by granting subsidized loans aimed at economic and social development, our
second andmain hypothesis is the following:
H2. BNDES loans not only increase investments by the company but also amplify the




2.4 Forms and modalities of Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development
financial support
The BNDES provides financial resources in the form of direct or indirect financial support.
A loan is classified as a direct operation when the BNDES does not use the services of banks
and other financial institutions in the market (accredited network). The financial resources
and the operation and administration of credit are entirely carried out by the BNDES. In
contrast, loans in the indirect form include the participation of banks and other financial
institutions in themarket.
Indirect operations, in turn, can be automatic or nonautomatic. In automatic operations,
the accredited financial institution receives the loan application, analyzes it and approves
the loan. Then, it requests the BNDES to ratify the operation and release financial resources.
In nonautomatic operations, the accredited bank receives the loan application, and there is a
prior consultation with the BNDES regarding the approval or denial of credit.
Due to the complexity and high value involved in direct and nonautomatic operations, it
is reasonable to assume that they are related to projects that would be difficult to finance
using only the cash flow generated internally by companies. Therefore, such projects would
require the supply of external resources subject to the financial constraints of the companies.
Thus, it is expected that the sensitivity of the investment to cash flow is higher in cases
involving direct or nonautomatic operations, generating our third hypothesis:
H3. Credit operations that involve direct and more active participation of the BNDES
involve companies with greater financial constraints.
3. Methodological procedures
3.1 Description of the data and statistical procedures
To perform the analyses, data for publicly traded companies whose shares were traded on
the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) in the period from 2002 to 2014 were extracted
from EconomaticaVR . Financial company-years (banks, investment funds, financial
institutions) with total assets of less than US$5m, in which the current liabilities or total debt
was greater than the total assets and where Tobin’s Q was less than zero or greater than 10,
were excluded. The sample in the present study, after the data treatment, comprised 406
companies and 3,140 company-year observations. The values were inflated by the Extended
National Consumer Price Index (IPCA) until 2014.
The initial sample was compared with information provided by the BNDES regarding
loans granted from 2002 to 2014. The loans were presented in the direct, indirect, automatic
and nonautomatic forms andmodalities on the BNDESwebsite.
To create the list of companies that contracted loans from the BNDES, each National
Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ) for the companies selected in Bovespa for the study was
consulted. After data treatment, a subsample of the BNDES comprising 193 companies and
862 company-year observations with loan contracts was obtained.
Another aspect analyzed in this study was the forms and modalities of support through
funding. The variables involved are DIR (measures the direct or indirect forms) and AUT
(measures the automatic or nonautomatic modalities), which show how the 862 company-
year observations with BNDES contracts were distributed in the period.
Given the selected observations and subsamples of BNDES observations, the outliers
were treated by winsorization (in the 5th and 95th percentiles) of the variables involved in






Financial constraints were analyzed using an adapted investment-cash flow sensitivity
model [equation (1)], discussed by Almeida and Campello (2007), and the models used for the
study of companies in Brazil, according to Terra (2003) and Ghani et al. (2015). The model
assumes that the investments (INV) made by a company in a given period are dependent on
Tobin’sQ (Q) of the company at the beginning of the period, cash flow (CF) and the presence
of tangible assets (TANG):








Investments (INV) are defined by the value of the variable Capex (capital expenditure)
divided by the total assets at the beginning of the period (Brown & Petersen, 2009).
The proxy for investment opportunities is given by the lagged Tobin’s Q (Qt-1), which
is defined by the sum of the total assets with the market value of the company’s shares
minus the net equity value, and the result is divided by the total assets (Almeida &
Campello, 2007). The CF uses as proxy the Earnings Before Interests, Taxes,
Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) value divided by the total assets at the
beginning of the period (Almeida & Campello, 2010; Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan &
Zingales, 1997). The TANG variable is the proxy for the level of tangible assets of the
company and is calculated by the value of fixed assets divided by the total assets at
the beginning of the period (Almeida & Campello, 2010; Farre-Mensa & Ljungqvist,
2016). The control variables are represented by the vector Xi,t.
If financial constraint is present, a positive and significant relationship between
the variables INV and CF is expected. The variable Qt-1, when positive and
significant, indicates that the value of the company can influence its investments.
Regarding the TANG variable, it is expected that when it is positive and significant,
the investments will be higher due to the greater presence of tangible assets in the
company-year. The companies in the sample are identified by index i and the years
(2002 to 2014) by index t.
In the aforementioned model, the following control variables (Xi,t) were included:
company size (SIZ), variation in share capital (SC) and variation in long-term debt
(DBT). The variable SIZ is a proxy for company size and is calculated by the natural
logarithm of annual net sales (Almeida & Campello, 2010). The variables SC and DBT
were adapted from Brown and Petersen (2009) to capture the influences of resources
external to the company. The variable SC represents the variation in the share capital
of the company-years and is calculated by the natural logarithm of the share capital; it
is a proxy for the capture of external resources by issuing shares. The variable DBT is
the variation in long-term debt, calculated by the natural logarithm of long-term loans
and financing of company-years; it is a proxy for obtaining external resources
through third-party capital.
It is expected that in the presence of financial constraints, the variable SIZ is
significant and negative. In smaller companies, there is greater information
asymmetry and lower real guarantees and therefore greater difficulty in finding
financial resources (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Gilchrist & Himmelberg,
1995). Regarding the SC and DBT variables, it is expected that they capture the
influence of external resources to finance the company’s investments; in this case, the




3.3 Variables of Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development loans
To assess the behavior of the variable of investment (INV), relative to BNDES loans,
variables related to the contracting of BNDES loans are included in the model. The
dummy variable BNDES takes the value 1 for the years in which the companies
contracted loans from the BNDES and 0 for the years in which no loans were
contracted.
From the variable that measures financial constraint (CF), an interaction variable
was created: CF * BNDES. This variable captures the effect of the credit multiplier on
the company-years that contracted loans from the BNDES. It is expected that its
coefficient, when significant and positive, shows that companies that have contracted
BNDES loans are able to multiply the effect of cash flow on their investments.
Equation (2) includes the BNDES interaction variable in the initial model:







year þ ui;t (2)
Regarding the form of BNDES loans, the variable DIR was created, which can take
continuous values between 0 and 1. It takes a value of 1 when all contracts were
performed, directly, by a company in a specific year with the BNDES. When all
contracts were indirect, the variable takes the value zero. If in the same year there were
contracts in both forms, the variable takes on values between 0 and 1, weighted
according to the annual loan value of each form.
The same dynamic was applied to the loaning modality: automatic or nonautomatic
(AUT).
In the data analysis, pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were generated, in
addition to analyses with fixed and random effects estimators (Gujarati & Porter, 2011;
Wooldridge, 2011). However, considering that the Hausman test indicated the results
generated by the fixed effects as the most appropriate, only the results generated by this
estimator were reported. The concern with endogeneity problems is always present in
regression models such as those developed in our article. The endogeneity related to omitted
variables, for example, is a source of concern. In this context, the fixed effects
transformation presents a series of benefits in the estimation by incorporating the effects of
unobserved heterogeneities and, thus, addresses an important limitation of the OLS related
to the biases caused by variables omitted from the model. In addition, another important
problem related to linear models concerns heteroscedasticity, which is corrected in this
article through the application of robust errors. Despite all the care taken in the data
treatment, it is always important to remember that some limitations related to the
endogeneity of the model may still persist. For example, the independent variables of the
model, such as Tobin’s Q and cash flow, may be endogenous not only to investment (which
would generate a reverse causality effect) but also to other variables such as company size,
profitability, debt, among others.
4. Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows statistics related to the dependent variable (INV), main independent
variable (CF) and control variables in the model. Comparing the means of the main
model variables, Student’s t test shows that in the subsamples of company-year





means. The variable Qt-1 has statistically equal means in the subsamples with and
without BNDES, with a confidence level of 95%. An important result of Table 1
concerns the investment variable. The companies that contracted loans from the
BNDES invested significantly more than the companies that did not contract loans,
which corroborates H1. The former had a mean of 8.99% investment in total assets,
while the latter invested 7.18%. The control variables CF, TANG, SIZ, SC and DBT
were also significantly higher in companies that used the BNDES. With respect to CF,
TANG and SIZ, the analysis of the difference in means suggests that the reduction of
the financial constraint promoted by the use of BNDES loans promoted increases in
cash flow, tangibility and size, as expected. With respect to the variables SC and DBT,
which represent the variation in share capital and the variation in long-term debt,
respectively, it is important to note that the reduction of financial constraint is
associated with the increase in other sources of funds, leading to a complementarity
effect between the BNDES and other financing alternatives related to equity and
third-party capital.
4.2 Multivariate analysis of the determinants of investment
Although Table 1 shows evidence that helps corroborate H1, the results are from
univariate analysis and do not consider the joint effect of the determinants of
investment. To confirm the univariate results – and, in particular, to determine the




















Qt1 0.0149*** (0.003) 0.0151*** (0.003) 0.0202*** (0.006)
CF 0.1902*** (0.017) 0.1790*** (0.019) 0.2143*** (0.039)
TANG 0.1434*** (0.008) 0.1481*** (0.009) 0.1268*** (0.016)
Fixed effects of firm and time Yes Yes Yes
N 2885 2081 804
R2 0.2864 0.2898 0.3189
F 66.13 45.92 18.82
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at
the 5, 1 and 0.1% levels, respectively
Table 1.
Basic statistics of the
study variables
relative to the general
sample
Var.
General sample (I) Without BNDES (II) With BNDES (III) Diff. II and
n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD III p-value
INV 2903 0.0768 0.0792 2098 0.0718 0.0806 805 0.0899 0.0739 0.000
Qt1 3139 1.3523 0.6347 2277 1.3476 0.6474 862 1.3648 0.6003 0.484
CF 2926 0.1381 0.0925 2117 0.1346 0.0948 809 0.1472 0.0853 0.001
TANG 3031 0.3235 0.2438 2195 0.3040 0.2458 836 0.3747 0.2309 0.000
SIZ 3059 7.1551 1.6653 2198 6.9823 1.7112 861 7.5963 1.4523 0.000
SC 3138 6.2952 1.5220 2276 6.2266 1.5247 862 6.4765 1.5008 0.000




financial constraint of the companies – Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the
multivariate regression analyses for companies that took and did not take BNDES
loans. In addition to the results of the panel analysis with fixed effects (reported in the
tables), analyses with pooled data and with random effects were also performed (not
reported due to space limitations). Both the Breusch–Pagan and Hausman tests
showed that the results with fixed effects were more appropriate, which is why we
chose to report only the latter. In addition, the standard errors are corrected by the
White–Huber estimator as a function of heteroscedasticity.
Table 2 shows the results of the base model [equation (1)] without the effect of the
interaction of the BNDES with cash flow. The cash flow coefficient (CF) for companies
with BNDES loans (coefficient = 0.2143, p-value < 0.001) is higher than that of
companies without BNDES loans (coefficient = 0.170, p-value < 0.001). This
difference is an indication that companies that have borrowed from the BNDES are
more financially restricted. It is important to remember that, according to the
investment-cash flow sensitivity model, the greater the effect of cash flow on
investment expenditure is, the greater the financial constraint faced by the company.
This effect would represent more difficulty for the company in raising external
resources (whether debt or new shares).
Table 3 shows the results of the regressions with the inclusion of three new control
variables: SIZ, variation in SC and DBT. The financial constraint remains in the
samples and is greater in company-years with BNDES loans. This result reinforces
the presence of financial constraint in the sample, especially in the sample with
BNDES loans.
Among the control variables included in the analysis, there was no significance for
SC in the three samples (Table 3). For the DBT variable, there was significance with a
positive relationship in the general sample and with BNDES loans. This result means
that companies that borrowed from the BNDES also managed to raise third-party
capital that was channeled into new investments. For the variable company size (SIZ),
there was a negative significance in the three samples. That is, larger companies
invested less, perhaps due to the lack of good projects with positive NPV.
Table 3.
Multiple regression,



















Qt1 0.0182*** (0.003) 0.0197*** (0.004) 0.0210*** (0.006)
CF 0.2024*** (0.019) 0.1867*** (0.023) 0.2488*** (0.042)
TANG 0.1299*** (0.009) 0.1342*** (0.011) 0.1195*** (0.016)
SIZ 0.0138*** (0.004) 0.0135** (0.004) 0.0248* (0.011)
SC 0.0055 (0.004) 0.0043 (0.004) 0.0012 (0.007)
DBT 0.0034* (0.002) 0.0012 (0.002) 0.0085* (0.004)
Fixed effects of firm and time Yes Yes Yes
N 2530 1729 801
R2 0.2860 0.2886 0.3291
F 47.63 30.77 16.30
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at





4.3 Analysis of the credit multiplier
In a progressive comparison of the effects of the variables related to the BNDES on
the variable INV, Table 4 is an extension of Table 3. An interaction variable CF *
BNDES is then inserted. The dummy variable BNDES takes a value of 1 when the
company-year observation contains BNDES loans and zero otherwise. This
interaction variable aims to show the effect of the credit multiplier effect produced by
BNDES loans. The interaction variable showed strong significance, with a positive
relationship, indicating that the multiplier effect is strong in companies that
borrowed from the BNDES. In other words, companies that have borrowed funds from
the BNDES can amplify the effect of cash flow on investments. Despite the differences






with the inclusion of
interaction variables,
in an unbalanced






Independent variables General sample (Fixed effects) General sample (Fixed effects)
INV INV
Qt1 0.0182*** (0.003) 0.0176*** (0.003)
CF 0.2024*** (0.019) 0.1880*** (0.020)
TANG 0.1299*** (0.009) 0.1285*** (0.009)
SIZ 0.0138*** (0.004) 0.0147*** (0.004)
SC 0.0055 (0.004) 0.0045 (0.004)
DBT 0.0034* (0.002) 0.0034* (0.002)
CF * BNDES 0.0818*** (0.023)




Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at
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INV INV INV INV
Qt1 0.0195 (0.011) 0.0193* (0.008) 0.0185* (0.007) 0.0272* (0.013)
CF 0.3476*** (0.077) 0.1544** (0.056) 0.1894*** (0.049) 0.3632*** (0.097)
TANG 0.0394 (0.024) 0.2100*** (0.027) 0.2208*** (0.026) 0.0298 (0.028)
SIZ 0.0495** (0.016) 0.0003 (0.017) 0.0095 (0.015) 0.0537** (0.019)
SC 0.0242* (0.011) 0.0079 (0.012) 0.0031 (0.010) 0.0183 (0.015)
DBT 0.0136 (0.008) 0.0082 (0.004) 0.0095* (0.004) 0.0084 (0.011)
Fixed effects of firm
and time Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 316 485 540 261
R2 0.3356 0.3504 0.3797 0.3472
F 5.22 9.74 13.02 4.17
Notes: The t statistics are in parentheses. The asterisks *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at




showed that tangibility exerts a credit multiplier effect. In our case, however, the
multiplier effect analyzed is that of the BNDES.
4.4 Forms and modalities of Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development
support and financial constraint
After comparing subsamples with and without BNDES loans, the study narrows its
analysis of financial constraint to only company-years with BNDES loans. In this phase, the
focus is on the form andmodality of financial support.
The variable that indicates the level of financial constraint (CF) stands out in
Table 5, as it was significant in the four subsamples. The greatest indications of
financial constraint are in the samples of company-years that had loans approved
through direct form and nonautomatic modality (Columns 2 and 5 of Table 5),
corroborating H3. It is important to remember that direct operations and
nonautomatic operations are related to more complex and higher-value projects.
Therefore, the internal generation of cash flow would not be sufficient to finance the
totality of these projects. Thus, companies would need to resort to external resources,
thereby increasing their level of financial constraint. As a result, it is expected that the cash
flow coefficient – which represents the level of financial constraint – will be statistically and
economically higher when credit operations are direct or nonautomatic. In fact, the cash flow
coefficient in direct operations (coefficient = 0.3476, p-value< 0.001) is twice as high as that of
indirect operations (coefficient = 0.1544, p-value < 0.01). Likewise, the coefficient of
nonautomatic operations (coefficient = 0.3632, p-value < 0.001) is almost twice as high as that
of automatic operations (coefficient = 0.1894, p-value< 0.001).
A secondary result that may be associated with the nature of the investments
concerns tangibility. As we can see, tangibility showed a positive and statistically
significant relationship in indirect or automatic operations. This result may be
associated with the fact that such transactions are strongly associated with collateral.
After all, a large part of these operations is intended to finance specific assets that, in
turn, are given as guarantees in case of default, i.e. nonpayment. The same result was
not found in direct or nonautomatic operations, which suggests that collateral is not
important in such operations.
5. Final considerations
The main objective of this article was to analyze whether companies that contracted
BNDES loans between 2002 and 2014 were able to invest more than companies that
did not. Our study presents important results on the role of the BNDES in reducing
financial constraints and increasing the ability of companies to invest. That is,
companies that borrowed from the BNDES invested more than companies that did
not. More importantly, however, our study showed that BNDES loans create a type of
credit multiplier that significantly increases the investment capacity of each
monetary unit of cash flow.
However, an important side effect may emerge from the relaxation of this financial
constraint. Access to subsidized loans from the BNDES can eventually exacerbate
problems of overinvestment and cause companies to invest in projects with negative
NPV that would not be carried out with market resources (such as debentures and





main objective of this article, and we suggest that it be properly addressed in future
studies.
The BNDES is a development bank founded in the 1950s that remains active in the
Brazilian economy to this day, as has occurred with other banks around the world
(Hermann, 2011; Luna-Martínez & Vicente, 2012). Such banks, however, are gaining
new contours and transnational configurations, as is the case of continental banks in
Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, the presence of state management persists, which
sometimes focuses on the needs of the economy and sometimes focuses on interests
foreign to the role of development banks. As the studies on development banks are
less numerous than the studies on private institutions, this topic certainly has
substantial room for the exploration and investigation of the paths that these banks
have traveled and will travel, with those institutions gaining increasingly more
support and incentive from global organizations such as the World Bank and the
United Nations.
The role of the BNDES is controversial, but our study showed that it played an
important role in offering credit to financially constrained companies. However, the
need for it not to compete with private banks is an important aspect, which may
distort its original role in the development of the country. Studies that can analyze the
performance of the BNDES in different political periods (e.g. different presidents of
the republic) may bring another facet of its role in terms of political influence and the
effective protection of the economy. These and other research problems can also be
analyzed in future studies.
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